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They were careless people, Tom and Daisy – they smashed up
things and creatures and then retreated back into their money or their
vast carelessness, or whatever it was that kept them together, and let
other people clean up the mess they had made. . . .**
I congratulate the editors of the Akron Law Review and the
Constitutional Law Center of the University of Akron School of Law for
launching Akron Law Review: Strict Scrutiny. By offering rapid analysis
and commentary on current issues, it promises to enhance the quality of
discourse on constitutional law. I thank them for allowing me to
contribute to this inaugural edition.

* Schott-van den Eynden Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law
** F. SCOTT FITZGERALD, THE GREAT GATSBY 158 (Charles Scribner‟s Sons ed. 1953) (1925).
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I am also grateful to Professor Wilson Huhn for permitting me to
respond to his fine article. I hope that our exchange will help to
illuminate thinking about the many difficult questions concerning
marriage, religious freedom, and homosexuality. I believe that the
matters on which we disagree fall generally into two categories – one
relating to marriage, the other relating to religious freedom and laws
barring discrimination against homosexuality. I address the former in
Part I of my Reply, the latter in Part II.
I. MARRIAGE, HOMOSEXUALITY, EQUALITY AND DEMOCRACY
As Professor Huhn says, there is much on which we agree. I
concur that the Free Exercise Clause gives citizens no power to override
an Equal Protection decision by the Supreme Court (his answer to his
Question 1),1 or a decision of a state supreme court to compel legal
recognition of same-sex “marriage” (SSM) (his answer to his Question
2).2 We part company, though, over the meaning of equality and its
application to marriage.

1. Wilson R. Huhn, Ten Questions on Gay Rights and Freedom of Religion, 1 AKRON
STRICT SCRUTINY 1 (2009), http://strictscrutiny.akronlawreview.com/files/2009/07/ten-questionson-gay-rights-and-freedom-of-religion.pdf. However, I do object to his statement that the people of
a state do not “have a constitutional right under the Free Exercise Clause to enact their religious
beliefs into law.” Id. Any group may seek to enact its beliefs, subject only to the limits of the
Constitution, including the Establishment Clause. Religion has motivated the enactment of many of
our laws, including several (like the Civil Rights Acts) that I presume Professor Huhn supports. See
George W. Dent, Jr., Secularism and the Supreme Court, 1999 BYU L. REV. 1, 30 (1999)
(describing the key role of religion in much legislation). Indeed, the principle of equality that
Professor Huhn champions so enthusiastically is based on religion. See infra notes 8 and
accompanying text.
2. Huhn, supra note 1, at 2-3. I must point out, however, some misleading language in his
Question 2. He refers to court decisions “that recognized a right to same sex marriage.” Id. at 2.
There was no question in those cases that same-sex groups have a right to marry. The question was
whether the state had to legally recognize those “marriages” in the same way that it treated
traditional marriages.
Similarly, it is inaccurate of Professor Huhn to say that I oppose same-sex “marriage” and
believe that gay couples “must not be permitted to marry.” Id. at 2-3 n.11. I do not. I oppose only
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A. The Meaning of Equality
Professor Huhn challenges the claim (which I cannot claim to have
originated but which I endorse) that the concept of equality is “empty”
because it holds only that likes must be treated alike, but application of
the norm depends entirely on what things we deem to be alike.3
Although Professor Huhn says he disagrees,4 his ensuing discussion
seems (wisely) to accept it. Indeed, he quotes Abraham Lincoln as
saying that the founders “did not intend to declare all men equal in all
respects,” but only in respect to “certain inalienable rights, among which
are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”5 I agree.
I also agree with Lincoln (and Professor Huhn) that equality has no
fixed meaning but constantly evolves and is open to reconsideration.6
Equality is a term of art, not a mechanical concept. Certainly equality
cannot mean that everyone is to be treated the same in all respects. That
would mean, for example, that Bill Gates and a destitute homeless
person would pay the same amount in taxes. It would mean the law
could make no distinctions based on age in voting, driving a car, or
collecting Social Security. I am sure that this is not what Professor
Huhn intends.
In other words, as I said, application of the norm depends on what
things we deem at any given time to be alike, and in what respects we
deem them to be alike. Professor Huhn (and Lincoln) are wise to
concede this, because it could hardly be otherwise. Every law makes
certain choices. Or, to put it another way, every law discriminates. A
law that punishes (or rewards) certain behavior punishes (or rewards)
people who are apt to engage in that behavior. There are always some
its state recognition and the legal compulsion of individuals (e.g., employers) to honor those
“marriages” as equal to traditional marriages.
3. The idea is generally attributed to Peter Westen. Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of
Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1982).
4. Huhn, supra note 1, at 10.
5. Id. at 11 (emphasis in original) (quoting 2 ABRAHAM LINCOLN, COLLECTED WORKS OF
ABRAHAM
LINCOLN
406
(Roy
Prentice
Basler
ed.)
(1953),
available
at
http://quod.lib.umich.edu/l/lincoln/).
6. See Huhn, supra note 1, at 12.
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who dislike the choice that any law makes; if everyone agreed with the
law, there would be no need for it. The Equal Protection Clause only
demands that there be a good enough reason (e.g., a rational basis or
compelling justification, depending on the issue in question) for the
distinction the law has made.
At several points, Professor Huhn stresses Supreme Court decisions
that seem to preclude the democratic majority from enacting laws that
stem from religiously-based principles.7 The problem with this is that
our nation‟s entire commitment to rights, including the principle of
equality, stem from religious faith. The equality and the “inalienable
rights” of “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” that Professor
Huhn properly invokes are proclaimed by the Declaration of
Independence to be “endowed by [our] Creator.”8 Religion has been
crucial throughout American history, including during the abolition and
civil rights movements.9 Professor Huhn lauds our religiously-based
laws but simultaneously declares that religiously-based laws are
forbidden.
Without a religious basis, rights are often considered, as Bentham
put it, “simple nonsense: natural and imprescriptible rights, rhetorical
nonsense, – nonsense upon stilts.”10 Efforts to establish a secular ground
for rights have been ineffective.11 Since Professor Huhn and others who
purport to oppose religiously-based laws do not really want to jettison
many of our rights based on religious belief, they are reduced to an
unprincipled selectivity – they condemn laws they do not like while
ignoring the religious basis of laws and principles (like equality) that
they do like.

7. Id. at 2 (citing Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963)); id. at
3 (citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984)).
8. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
9. See George W. Dent, Jr., Religion, Morality and Democracy: New Learning, New
Challenges, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 401, 427-28 (2004).
10. JEREMY BENTHAM, Anarchical Fallacies, in 2 WORKS 501 (John Bowring ed., 1843).
11. See MICHAEL J. PERRY, TOWARD A THEORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS: RELIGION, LAW, AND
COURTS (2006).
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B. Equality and Marriage
This brings us to the question of marriage. Professor Huhn declares:
Gays and lesbians are entitled to equal rights, including equal
marriage rights, because the love that they have for each other is
indistinguishable from the love that heterosexual men and women have
for their partners. Their relationships are just as valuable to themselves
and to society – just as important and just as sacred as the love between
heterosexual couples.12
I will not quarrel here with Professor Huhn‟s assertion that
homosexual relationships are “just as sacred” as traditional marriages.13
He is entitled to his own religious belief (though most human beings do
not share it), but he has no legal right to impose it on everyone else.
There are, however, many problems with his claim that homosexual
relationships are “just as valuable . . . to society.”14 At least among men
(who comprise about two-thirds of all homosexuals), homosexual
practices are more likely to spread disease.15 Heterosexual relationships
integrate the two sexes and foster understanding and goodwill between
them, which may be viewed as beneficial in the same way that
integration is often considered beneficial, in that it fosters understanding
and goodwill among different racial, ethnic, class and national groups.16
However, the most obvious and important difference is that
heterosexuality creates human life, homosexuality does not. This,
without more, could be a legitimate basis for distinguishing between the
two. Most people see the bearing and raising of children as an intrinsic

12. Huhn, supra note 1, at 12.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. See George W. Dent, Jr., Civil Rights for Whom?: Gay Rights Versus Religious Freedom,
95 KY. L.J. 553, 640 n.572 (2007) (citing several studies).
16. Even gay activists sometimes acknowledge this fact. See ANDREW SULLIVAN,
VIRTUALLY NORMAL: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT HOMOSEXUALITY 196 (1995) (“The timeless,
necessary, procreative unity of a man and a woman is inherently denied homosexuals; and the way
in which . . . parenthood transforms their relationship, is far less common among homosexuals than
among heterosexuals.”).
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good – that is, something that is good in itself and not merely
instrumental to the attainment of another good.17
Given the scientific and social benefits of the heterosexual
relationship, it is not surprising that philosophers, artists, singers, and
poets in all nations and in all ages have lauded it. Different cultures
have treated heterosexual relationships in different ways, but all have
sanctioned marriage. Marriage customs have varied, but have always
been exclusively heterosexual and always centrally concerned with the
bearing and raising of children. Attitudes toward homosexuality have
also varied. In some cultures, certain homosexual practices have been
tolerated or condoned (although almost never has it been respectable for
an adult male to be the receptive partner in homosexual activity).
However, with a very few, very recent exceptions, homosexual
relationships have never been eligible for legal marriage.
Professor Huhn rejoins that homosexuals “can adopt or use
reproductive technology to have children.”18 Societies throughout the
world and throughout history have provided for adoption, which is a
crucial institution that often produces loving relationships. Nonetheless,
in general, adoption has been considered an unfortunate necessity for
situations where the biological parents are unable or unwilling to care
for a child, not an equal alternative to biological parenting to be
employed for the gratification of adults. In all cultures, in all eras, the
bond between biological parents and their children has been considered
uniquely strong and valuable.
Contrary to the accusations of pro-gay activists, this preference for
biological parentage is not just anti-gay bigotry. As reported in the New
York Times, “[f]rom a child‟s point of view, according to a growing
body of social research, the most supportive household is one with two

17. See Stephen L. Carter, Liberal Hegemony and Religious Resistance: An Essay on Legal
Theory, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT 47 (Michael W. McConnell, Robert F.
Cochran, Jr., & Angela C. Carmella eds., 2001).
18. Huhn, supra note 1, at 3 n.11.
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biological parents in a low-conflict marriage.”19 Some claims have been
made that children raised by gay couples fare equally well. These
claims are seriously flawed. First, most of them do not compare
adoptees of gay couples to traditional families. Some compare the
adoptees to children of single parents, who in general fare much worse
than children in traditional families.20
Further, these studies have small, self-selected samples, carelessly
analyzed over short periods of time. It is hardly surprising that gay
couples who respond to inquiries about their recent adoptions would
report that all is well. When divorce laws were liberalized, hasty studies
soon reported that children had benefitted from the ending of highconflict marriages. Only many years later did the deep wounds to
children from divorce become apparent.21
Adoption is necessary or desirable in some cases, but, other things
being equal, traditional married couples are generally the best candidates
for adoptive parenthood. For one thing, “men and women bring
different strengths to the parenting enterprise.”22 Ideally, every child
would have a mother and a father. Gays need not be strictly barred from
adoption; in some cases adoption by one or more homosexuals may be
19. Blaine Harden, 2-Parent Families Rise After Change in Welfare Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
12, 2001. See generally George W. Dent, Jr., How Does Same-Sex Marriage Threaten You?, 59
RUTGERS L. REV. 233, 240-43 (2007).
20. See Lynn D. Wardle, Considering the Impacts on Children and Society of “Lesbigay”
Parenting, 23 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 541 (2004) (listing the methodological flaws of these studies,
especially the use of small, self-selected samples).
21. See MARGARET F. BRINIG, FROM CONTRACT TO COVENANT: BEYOND THE LAW AND
ECONOMICS OF THE FAMILY 174-77 (2000); ELIZABETH MARQUARDT, BETWEEN TWO WORLDS:
THE INNER LIVES OF CHILDREN OF DIVORCE (2005); JUDITH WALLERSTEIN, JULIA LEWIS &
SANDRA BLAKESLEE, THE UNEXPECTED LEGACY OF DIVORCE: A 25 YEAR LANDMARK STUDY
(2000); BARBARA DAFOE WHITEHEAD, THE DIVORCE CULTURE: RETHINKING OUR COMMITMENTS
TO MARRIAGE AND FAMILY (1996). Liberalized divorce also inflicted harm to women. See
generally LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA (1985).
22. WITHERSPOON INST., MARRIAGE AND THE PUBLIC GOOD: TEN PRINCIPLES 18 (2006).
See also WADE HORN & TOM SYLVESTER, FATHER FACTS 153 (2002); ELEANOR E. MACOBY, THE
TWO SEXES: GROWING UP APART, COMING TOGETHER (1998); Thomas G. Powers et al.,
Compliance and Self-Assertion: Young Children’s Responses to Mothers Versus Fathers, 30
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCH. 980 (1994).
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the best available option for a child. However, we should not simply
assume that such adoption is equal to adoption by a traditional married
couple. For this and other reasons, Professor Huhn is wrong to suggest
that the recognition of marriage between an older man and woman is
inconsistent with the non-recognition of same-sex “marriage.”23
Even if adoption by homosexuals is sometimes the best option, it
does not follow that this possibility requires licensing of same-sex
“marriages.” Unlike biological reproduction, adoption is a legal
construct. The law can allow adoption by any individual or group it
chooses. (In Donizetti‟s opera, The Daughter of the Regiment, a girl is
adopted by an entire army unit.) There is no necessary connection to
marriage, and there may be cases where it would be desirable to have coguardians (e.g., a widower and his mother or sister) who are not eligible
to marry. That option could include gay couples.
Professor Huhn‟s reference to homosexuals‟ use of “reproductive
technology to have children”24 is more disturbing. Many commentators
(myself included) have expressed concerns about the effects of turning
children into manufactured products who, like a computer, may be
rendered obsolete by the new, improved model that is developed and
marketed two or three years later.25 These concerns are serious enough
to give pause over the use of certain kinds of reproductive technology,
even for infertile traditional married couples.
These concerns are even greater with respect to homosexuals.
Again, ideally every child should have a mother and a father.
Misfortune sometimes makes that impossible, and adoption may be the
best option in some of these cases. To deliberately bring a child into the

23. Huhn, supra note 1, at 3 n.11. In addition to the reasonableness of treating heterosexual
and homosexual couples differently for purposes of adoption, refusal to recognize marriages of
infertile heterosexual couples would violate our principles of personal privacy and our practice of
drawing general rules in many cases rather than making complex, individual determinations. See
Dent, supra note 19, at 242 n.55; George W. Dent, Jr., Traditional Marriage: Still Worth Defending,
18 BYU J. PUB. L. 419, 432 (2004).
24. See Huhn, supra note 1, at 3 n.11.
25. See Dent, supra note 9, at 440-46.
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world without a mother or without a father, however, strikes me as child
abuse.26
Although homosexual relationships are not “just as good as”
traditional marriages, perhaps the benefits of licensing gay “marriages”
would outweigh the detriments. That seems highly unlikely. Much of
the social benefit of legal recognition of marriage stems from the
expressive function of law – i.e., the use of law “in expressing social
values and in encouraging social norms to move in particular
directions.”27
Recognizing gay “marriages” would alter the expressive meaning
of marriage. For the first time in our history, the law would license
relationships that are inherently incapable of creating children. Marriage
would be seen less as an institution for the nurturing of children and
more as an arrangement for the gratification of adults. It would also
diminish the prestige of marriage among heterosexuals, because most
people consider gay “marriage” a “mocking burlesque”28 or “mere
parody”29 of the real thing. Contrary to Professor Huhn‟s accusation, I
do not claim that if the law licenses gay “marriages,” “heterosexual
couples will desert the institution – they will simply not marry.”30
However, the rate of marriage would decline, and marriage would
become less normative. Indeed, this is an effect desired by many
advocates of SSM.31 Given the indifference or opposition of many gays

26. Children conceived by artificial reproductive technology and raised apart from one or
both biological parents “hunger for an abiding paternal presence.” KYLE D. PRUETT, FATHERNEED:
WHY FATHER CARE IS AS ESSENTIAL AS MOTHER CARE FOR YOUR CHILD 207 (2000). Some family
experts argue for a “birthright of children to be connected to their mothers and fathers” unless
external events preclude it or separation is legally imposed to protect the child. DANIEL CERE, War
of the Ring, in DIVORCING MARRIAGE: UNVEILING THE DANGERS IN CANADA‟S NEW SOCIAL
EXPERIMENT 9, 11 (Daniel Cere & Douglas Farrow eds., 2004). See also MARGARET SOMERVILLE,
What About the Children?, in id. at 67.
27. Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 953 (1996).
28. Hadley Arkes, The Closet Straight, NAT‟L REV., July 5, 1993, at 43, 45.
29. James Q. Wilson, Against Homosexual Marriage, COMMENTARY, Mar., 1996, at 34, 36
(quoting Kenneth Minogue).
30. Huhn, supra note 1, at 3 n.11.
31. See Dent, supra note 15, at 639 n.570.
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to SSM32 and the general instability of homosexual relationships (at least
among men),33 it is likely that marriage rates would be relatively low
among gays and divorce rates relatively high. As a result, heterosexuals
who did marry would probably take marriage less seriously.34
In addition to the problems with the claim that gay relationships
deserve equal recognition with traditional marriages, the argument of
Professor Huhn (and many others) that the constitutional principle of
equality demands licensing of gay marriage has two fundamental
inconsistencies. First, if legal recognition of marriage now creates
constitutionally offensive inequality, the solution would not be to extend
recognition to gay couples (or even to any group of people), but to get
the law out of the marriage business altogether, thereby ending the

32. See KATHLEEN E. HULL, SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: THE CULTURAL POLITICS OF LOVE AND
LAW 78 (2006); CLAUDIA CARD, Against Marriage, in SAME-SEX: DEBATING THE ETHICS,
SCIENCE, AND CULTURE OF HOMOSEXUALITY 317, 321 (John Corvino ed., 1997); PAULA L.
ETTELBRICK, Since When Is Marriage a Path to Liberation?, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: THE
MORAL AND LEGAL DEBATE 164 (Robert M. Baird & Stuart E. Rosenbaum eds., 1997); Anemona
Hartcollis, For Some Gays, a Right They Can Forsake, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2006, at 12.
33. See DENNIS ALTMAN, THE HOMOSEXUALIZATION OF AMERICA, THE AMERICANIZATION
OF THE HOMOSEXUAL 187 (1982) (“[A]mong gay men a long-lasting monogamous relationship is
almost unknown.”); Maria Xiridou et al., The Contribution of Steady and Casual Partnerships to the
Incidence of HIV Infection Among Homosexual Men in Amsterdam, 17 AIDS 1029, 1031 (2003)
(finding among a sample of Amsterdam men that gay male partnerships lasted on average 1.5 years
and that men in these partnerships had an average of eight casual partners per year). Many gay
activists laud promiscuity as a benefit of homosexuals because they are free of the obligations
stemming from breeding. See, e.g., DAVID A. J. RICHARDS, SEX, DRUGS, DEATH, AND THE LAW:
AN ESSAY ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND OVERCRIMINALIZATION 53 (1982).
34. Professor Huhn compares same-sex “marriage” to interracial marriage and notes that
“[w]hen interracial marriages were recognized in Loving v. Virginia, [388 U.S. 1 (1967)] there was
no overt movement among white racists to abandon the institution of marriage . . . .” Huhn, supra
note 1, at 3 n.11. His statement is accurate and the comparison to Loving is apt, but he gets the
lesson backwards. Anti-miscegenation laws were isolated departures from the traditions of Western
civilization. Loving brought American law back into line with Jewish and Christian doctrine and
Western tradition. By contrast, gay “marriage” has never been recognized in Western culture.
Since Loving simply effected a return to tradition, it is not surprising that there was no major effort
to overturn it. By contrast, since judicial decisions imposing same-sex marriage fundamentally
insult traditional American attitudes, it is not surprising that that these decisions have provoked
widespread opposition, and in several cases have been overturned by popular referendum.
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privileged status of the married relative to the unmarried. Marriage law
now discriminates against not just gays but against others who are
ineligible for licensing (like close relatives), and those who simply
prefer to cohabitate without marrying.
The law could treat people based on the facts of their relationships
(such as cohabitation and caring for children) rather than on a wedding.
And, indeed this is the goal of some who push to have traditional
marriage laws declared unconstitutional.
They reason (perhaps
correctly) that, as a policy matter, most people would prefer this option
to being compelled to honor SSM.35 Further, if marriage licensing is not
intended primarily for the protection of children, it is hard to see any
strong justification for licensing marriage at all, so that a legal
preference for marriage under any definition would be unconstitutional.
There is a second inconsistency. I agree in part with Professor
Huhn‟s claim that “most of the legal and social problems that arise under
the Constitution stem from the belief, held by some people, that they are
better than other people.”36 Clearly, such beliefs always have been and
still are frequent sources of injustice and strife.
However, as noted before,37 it is also inevitable that all law
discriminates; all law makes some people more deserving than others of
some benefit or detriment. Although this is not quite the same thing as
declaring some people inherently better than others, the difference often
seems negligible to the people affected. Again, it is possible to see
licensing of marriage as regulation of “breeders,” and many people (gay
and straight) do not consider a marriage license desirable for a
significant personal relationship. The primary expressive function of

35. See, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL
FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 228 (1995) (“[W]e should abolish marriage
as a legal category . . . .”); Martha M. Ertman, Marriage as a Trade: Bridging the Private/Private
Distinction, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79 (2001) (arguing for treating personal relationships
through contract rules modeled on corporate law); Tamar Lewin, Untying the Knot, For Better or
Worse: Marriage’s Stormy Future, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2003, at WK1 (“The most radical
structural change being discussed these days is taking the state out of the marriage business.”).
36. Huhn, supra note 1, at 10.
37. See supra Part I(A).
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current marriage law is to promote marriage for heterosexuals but, to
some extent, it also expresses a preference for heterosexuality.
The question, then, is whether that preference is justified or violates
the principle of equality. I have offered reasons for the preference that
are persuasive to most Americans, but not all. What should a judge do if
he or she is in the latter group? Professor Huhn says:
It is . . . our obligation under the Constitution to constantly look to
this ideal of equality, to constantly labor for it, to constantly reexamine
our own beliefs, our own preconceptions, our own attitudes, to consider
and reconsider and reconsider again whether or not that person or group
whom we thought to be inferior in fact might be our equal. 38
I agree. Many people, myself included, have done so, and most
Americans still support traditional marriage laws. Traditions can
change, and sometimes they should. That is what happened with the Jim
Crow racial segregation laws, anti-miscegenation laws, and criminal
sodomy laws, and thus the Supreme Court was right to hold them
unconstitutional. It is instructive that there was never any broad national
movement to reverse those holdings. Our traditions about marriage have
not changed. It is instructive that court decisions imposing SSM have
invariably provoked widespread opposition and have been overturned by
referendum every time citizens have been allowed to vote on this issue.
Thus, there is an inherent tension in judicial review in a democracy
– a handful of unelected judges with life tenure ripping up laws enacted
by legislators elected by democratic majorities in the name of equality.
This function is consistent with democracy in cases like the homosexual
sodomy and anti-miscegenation decisions, where laws seem out of step
with long-standing beliefs prevalent in our society. But, if judges
discard a law that does not meet that standard simply because it does not
conform to their own tastes, in effect they proclaim that they are better
than hoi polloi, the great unwashed. That is not legitimate. If equality
means anything, the broad popular consensus supporting traditional
marriage, now and at all times in our history – a consensus shared by
38.

Huhn, supra note 1, at 12 (emphasis in original).
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virtually all societies everywhere in history – should be binding on our
courts.
II. THE GAY MOVEMENT AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
I agree with Professor Huhn that “decisions recognizing the equal
rights of gays and lesbians” do not “in and of themselves, interfere with
the Free Exercise rights of any individual or any private business” (his
answer to his Question 4).39 I also agree that Employment Division,
Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith 40 “establish[es] the
standard for evaluating the constitutionality of laws under the Free
Exercise Clause” (his answer to his Question 5),41 and that laws
forbidding discrimination on the basis of religion are valid (his answer to
his Question 6).42 However, I deplore the Smith decision. It eviscerates
the right of free exercise by holding that it “does not relieve an
individual of the obligation to comply with a „valid and neutral law of
general applicability . . . .‟”43 Under this standard, a state may forbid all
consumption of alcohol, even in the Christian Holy Communion or a
Jewish Seder. Individuals still have a right of religious expression and
against arbitrary discrimination, but these rights are already protected by
the guarantee of Free Speech and the Equal Protection Clause, so that
the Free Exercise Clause is virtually meaningless.44

39. Huhn, supra note 1, at 4.
40. 494 U.S. 872 (1990), superseded in part by statute Religious Freedom Restoration Act of
1993, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb (West 2008).
41. Huhn, supra note 1, at 4.
42. Huhn, supra note 1, at 5.
43. 494 U.S. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
44. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57
U CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1144-45 (1990) (criticizing the Smith decision for “eliminating the doctrine of
free exercise exemptions . . . .”).
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A. Religious Expression in the Workplace
I also agree with Professor Huhn that expressing disapproval of a
co-worker‟s religion or trying to convert her can constitute illicit
religious discrimination if it is done in a way that creates a “hostile
environment.”45 The Supreme Court has held that, to create a hostile
environment, behavior must be severe or pervasive.46 However, in none
of the cases I have criticized was there (or could there have been) a
finding that the employee‟s behavior was so severe or pervasive as to
create a hostile environment.
Professor Huhn says that the law “requires employers to make
reasonable accommodation for their employees‟ religious observance or
practice. People have the right to express themselves on matters of
religion, but their co-workers also have the right to freedom from
harassment.”47 I agree, and wish that were the end of it. Unfortunately,
there are two problems.
First, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not require an
employer to accommodate an employee‟s religion if to do so would
cause “undue hardship” for the employer.48 That sounds fair, but courts
have held that “anything more than a de minimis cost” can constitute an
undue hardship, at least if it results in unequal treatment of employees.49
In other words, the protection of religious exercise by the Civil Rights
Act is de minimis.
The second problem concerns when religious expression constitutes
“harassment” of co-workers. Professor Huhn defends the decision in
Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co.50 that Peterson‟s firing did not violate

45. Huhn, supra note 1, at 6.
46. See Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
47. Huhn, supra note 1, at 7 (footnote omitted).
48. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e (j) (West 2009).
49. Bruff v. North Miss. Health Servs., Inc., 244 F.3d 495 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534
U.S. 952. See generally Karen Engle, The Persistence of Neutrality: The Failure of the Religious
Accommodation Provision to Redeem Title VII, 76 TEX. L. REV. 317, 392-406 (1997) (surveying
cases finding that courts require little of employers to accommodate employees‟ religious needs).
50. 358 F.3d 599 (9th Cir. 2004). See Huhn, supra note 1, at 6-7 n.28.
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his statutory rights. Professor Huhn says that “Peterson chose to
prominently display Bible verses,”51 but they were posted inside his
work cubicle.52 Although they were visible to people walking in the
adjacent corridor, they would not have been noticed by anyone who did
not stop and look into Peterson‟s cubicle to read them. 53 Recall that to
be illegal, harassment behavior must be “severe or pervasive.”54 The
display was about as discrete as a posting in the workplace could have
been.
Further, the verses displayed stated the Judeo-Christian attitude
toward homosexuality. To condemn them as forbidden harassment,
then, is to say that no expression of the Judeo-Christian view is
permitted. One side may proclaim its approval of homosexuality as
overtly as it wishes, and the other side must shut up. To call this
freedom of expression is truly Orwellian.
Professor Huhn also defends the firing of the employee in Bodett v.
Coxcom, Inc.55 He agrees that Bodett‟s statement to Carson that Bodett
“would be disappointed if Carson were dating another woman, but
happy if she were dating a man” was harassment.56 Again, this hardly
seems severe or pervasive. Moreover, Professor Huhn takes this one
statement out of the context of a long work relationship between the two
women. Carson never complained about Bodett‟s expressions of her
views until after Carson got a transfer with a promotion due in part to
Bodett‟s support. It looks more like Carson milked Bodett for what
benefits she could get from her, then viciously turned on Bodett and got
her fired.
Professor Huhn denies that an individual could be refused
employment or fired for disclosing her religion or posting the Ten
Commandments.57 However, if a jurisdiction bars discrimination against

51. Huhn, supra note 1, at 6-7 n.28.
52. 358 F.3d at 601.
53. See id.
54. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
55. 366 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2004). See Huhn, supra note 1, at 6-7 n.28.
56. Huhn, supra note 1, at 6-7 n.28 (quoting Bodett, 366 F.3d at 741).
57. Huhn, supra note 1, at 6-7 n.28.
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homosexuality, an employer would be prudent (and might be required)
to inquire whether incumbent or prospective employees would be likely
to violate that law, perhaps rendering the employer liable for permitting
harassment. A worker might then be asked if she adhered to a faith that
disapproved of homosexuality and, if so, whether she shared that
disapproval. A positive answer might be grounds for rejection or
dismissal.
Consider: Could an employer concerned about racial discrimination
ask employees or job applicants if they belong to and support the
principles of the Ku Klux Klan and fire or refuse to hire anyone who
does? I believe the answer is yes. Many gay activists want traditional
religious sects to be deemed as reprehensible as the Klan.58 As for
posting the Ten Commandments, if Richard Peterson could be fired for
posting biblical passages about homosexuality, why couldn‟t an
employee be fired for posting the commandment against adultery?
This scenario is not merely plausible but quite similar to some
recent cases. Carrie Prejean, the former Miss California, apparently was
denied selection as Miss USA 2009 because, in answer to a question
posed by a gay activist judge, she said people can choose same-sex
marriage but “I think that . . . marriage should be between a man and a
woman.”59 Thus even if Professor Huhn were right that one could not be
punished merely for disclosing one‟s religious affiliation, it seems that
any statement of a tenet of one‟s faith could be grounds for punishment
if it were displeasing to any other person.
Professor Huhn accuses me of favoring “individual immunity from
nondiscrimination laws for religiously-based expressions of
intolerance.”60 This is false. First, note the basis for nondiscrimination
laws themselves. Most forms of discrimination are perfectly legal. An
employer may openly discriminate on the basis of what college a person
58. See infra note 79 and accompanying text.
59. Miss North Carolina Crowned Miss USA 2009, Apr. 20, 2009,
http://www.msnbc.com/id/30298051. It apparently did not help Ms. Prejean that her position on the
matter is exactly the same as that expressed by President Obama.
60. Huhn, supra note 1, at 6-7 n.28.
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attended, what sports teams she cheers for, etcetera. Only a few grounds
for discrimination are forbidden.
There are plausible arguments against adding sexual orientation to
the list. Although discrimination against homosexuals is not uncommon,
they are not in general a disadvantaged group.61 Their median
disposable income exceeds that of heterosexuals.62 Unlike race or
gender, homosexuality is a behavioral characteristic, and that behavior
has been disapproved by many cultures around the world; the
disapproval is not an unusual quirk of American or Western
civilization.63
If discrimination against homosexuality is to be barred, however,
should there be some allowance for expressions of religious attitudes
that are uncongenial to homosexuals? Professor Huhn is (unfortunately)
right that under Smith there is no constitutional free exercise exemption
for individuals or businesses from laws barring discrimination against
homosexuals. That does not mean that legislative exemptions should not

61. Complaints about employment discrimination by homosexuals have not been very
numerous. See Richard F. Duncan, Who Wants to Stop the Church: Homosexual Rights Legislation,
Public Policy, and Religious Freedom, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 393, 409 n.55 (1994) (citing
studies showing fairly low rates of complaints); William B. Turner, The Gay Rights State:
Wisconsin’s Pioneering Legislation to Prohibit Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation, 22
WIS. WOMEN‟S L.J. 91, 120 (2007) (stating that the “total number of complaints claiming sexualorientation discrimination has apparently always been small” under Wisconsin‟s anti-discrimination
law).
62. Findings on the incomes of homosexuals vary. Compare Christopher Hewitt, The
Socioeconomic Position of Gay Men: A Review of the Evidence, 54 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 461 (1995)
(finding that gay men have above-average incomes), with M. V. LEE BADGETT, MONEY, MYTHS,
AND CHANGE: THE ECONOMIC LIVES OF LESBIANS AND GAY MEN (2001) (arguing against some of
the “myths” of gay affluence). However, since gays have many fewer children than heterosexuals,
their disposable income is higher.
63. See Clare Nullis, South Africans OK Bill Recognizing Gay Unions, PLAIN DEALER, Nov.
15, 2006, at A4 (stating that homosexuality is illegal in most of sub-Saharan Africa). Muslim
nations have repeatedly blocked efforts to adopt, or even discuss, an international accord
condemning discrimination against homosexuality. See Andrew Osborn, Muslim Alliance Derails
UN’s Gay Rights Resolution of UN, GUARDIAN, Apr. 25, 2003, at 17. In the West, disapproval of
homosexuality has ancient roots. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196-97 (1986) (Burger,
C.J., concurring) overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (“Homosexual sodomy was
a capital crime under Roman law.”).
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be granted (if such laws are to be enacted at all). Unlike homosexuality,
religious freedom has been a cornerstone of American values from the
nation‟s founding – as much, if not more so, than equality.64
A balance needs to be struck between the civil rights of gays and
the civil rights of religious people. Reasonable people can disagree
about where that balance should be struck. This is not the place for a
protracted discussion of the issue, so I will just offer a couple of general
principles.65 With respect to the provision of services, freedom of
conscience should be honored unless it would result in denial to a
homosexual of essential services. In other words, religious freedom
should be granted if the person seeking services can obtain them
elsewhere without serious hardship.
This principle would dictate different results in some court
decisions. In North Coast Women’s Care Medical Group v. San Diego
County Superior Court,66 for instance, the internist provided services
that the complainant could easily have obtained from hundreds of other
physicians in the same city (Los Angeles). The burden on the
complainant of having to go elsewhere was less than the burden on the
internist of having to violate her faith.67
In employment discrimination there should be an exemption for
small businesses (perhaps those with 50 or fewer employees) that have a
core religious commitment. Just as it is important to many people to
pursue a social commitment in their work, so it is important to many
people to maintain a religious commitment in their work. The law
should respect those commitments if they do not impose serious
hardships on others. Restricting the exemption to small businesses
makes it unlikely that the exemption will preclude a disappointed worker
from finding equivalent employment elsewhere.
64. See JOHN H. GARVEY, WHAT ARE FREEDOMS FOR? 49-57 (1996) (describing the
importance of religious freedom to the Founders).
65. I have discussed the issue at greater length in Dent, supra note 15, at 628-47.
66. 189 P.3d 959 (Cal. 2008).
67. This analysis would also have struck the balance in favor of religious freedom in the case
of the adoption services of Catholic Charities of Massachusetts. See Dent, supra note 15, at 591-92.
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B. Religious Expression Elsewhere
Professor Huhn says little about the conflict between the gay
movement and religious freedom outside the workplace.
He
acknowledges the constitutional right of expressive associations to
exclude from membership persons whose inclusion would violate the
association‟s principles,68 but ignores many other issues. The war
between the gay movement and religious freedom is broad, with battles
on many fronts, and it threatens religious freedom.
How much of a threat? The expressive elements of religious
services are probably safe by virtue of freedom of speech, but not much
else. Even the freedom of expressive associations upheld in Hurley v.
Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston69 and Boy
Scouts of America v. Dale70 drew several dissents in the Supreme Court.
With a couple of new justices, those decisions might be overturned.
Any activity not protected by freedom of speech would be subject
to the Smith test that a “neutral law of general applicability” is
constitutionally permissible.71 Moreover, even that limited freedom
could be reduced to insignificance by legal burdens other than outright
prohibition. For example, a religious organization‟s tax exemption
could be stripped away for discrimination,72 thereby financially crippling
the organization. Although the selection of clergy is probably protected
under Hurley and Dale, unless those cases are overruled, those cases
seem to extend only to employees in “leadership positions.”73
Except in places of worship, religious expression is subject to time,
place and manner limitations. This protects the right to speak in open,
public venues, like a park, but little else. Expression annoying to
homosexuals has been banned in public schools, even when it is a

68. Huhn, supra note 1, at 8.
69. 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
70. 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
71. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
72. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (discriminating on the basis of
race caused religious college to lose its tax exemption).
73. See Dent, supra note 15, at 614-15.
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response to an official campaign to condone homosexuality.74 Some
courts have ruled that a public school or college may refuse to recognize
a student organization based on religion.75 The government may exclude
religious organizations that do not approve of homosexuality from
public facilities.76 Religiously-affiliated organizations may be denied
government contracts or government funding if they discriminate against
homosexuals.77 In short, the Constitution (as now construed) offers
religious freedom little defense against antidiscrimination laws.
C. How Will This War Be Resolved?
The goal of gay activists is complete social acceptance that
homosexuality is, as Professor Huhn puts it, “indistinguishable from the
love that heterosexual men and women have for their partners. Their
relationships are just as valuable to themselves and to society – just as
important and just as sacred as the love between heterosexual couples.”78
Traditional religions deny this belief. Gay activists realize, then, that
their goal cannot be achieved so long as our society considers traditional
religions respectable. They call for an attack on “the moral authority of
homophobic churches by portraying them as antiquated backwaters,
badly out of step with the times and with the latest findings of
psychology.”79 Professor Huhn seems to endorse these attitudes by

74. See Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2006).
75. See Truth v. Kent Sch. Dist., 542 F.3d 634 (9th Cir. 2008).
76. See Barnes-Wallace v. Boy Scouts of Am., 275 F. Supp. 2d 1259 (S.D. Cal. 2003)
(holding that city could not favor Boy Scouts in leasing public park land because it is a religious
organization); Evans v. City of Berkeley, 129 P.3d 394 (Cal. 2006) (holding that city could bar Sea
Scouts from use of municipal marina).
77. See Catholic Charities of Me., Inc. v. City of Portland, 304 F. Supp.2d 77 (D. Me. 2004).
78. Huhn, supra note 1, at 12.
79. Marshall K. Kirk & Erastes Pill, Waging Peace, CHRISTOPHER ST., Dec. 1984, at 33, 38.
See also MARSHALL KIRK & HUNTER MADSEN, AFTER THE BALL: HOW AMERICA WILL CONQUER
ITS FEAR AND HATRED OF GAYS IN THE „90S, at 189 (1989) (advocating depicting traditionalists as
“[h]ysterical backwoods preachers, drooling with hate to a degree that looks both comical and
deranged,” thereby rendering them “so discreditable that even Intransigents will eventually be
silenced in public. . . .”).
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referring to the statements of traditional belief by Richard Peterson and
Evelyn Bodett as “expressions of intolerance.”80
The many cases I have cited show that the campaign to silence
traditional religious views of homosexuality by punishing their
expression in public has achieved considerable success. However, the
number of such incidents remains fairly small, and the reaction to the
mistreatment of Carrie Prejean indicates that, when the public is aware
of such events, it does not fully embrace the gay agenda. The adoption
of laws defending traditional marriage in every state where the matter
has been submitted to a democratic vote confirms this. Religious
freedom is deeply embedded in our society. So is religious belief.
Despite the efforts of the gay movement, the Catholic Church,
traditionalist Protestant sects, Orthodox Judaism, and Islam are not about
to slink away.
A compromise is not hard to imagine. Professor Huhn refers to the
events in Peterson and Bodett as “expressions of intolerance.”81
However, any statement of an attitude, opinion, or belief may be labeled
“intolerance” by one who does not share it. Again, speech that offends
others is curbed only in a few areas; in most matters people are free to
express their beliefs even when they displease others. Democrats may
criticize and even vilify Republicans, and vice versa. Disagreements
about homosexuality could be treated in the same way. Every human
being deserves to be treated with civility. Abuse and harassment violate
this right. However, disagreement, even when heated, about matters on
which people may legitimately disagree does not violate anyone‟s rights.
CONCLUSION
Professor Huhn waxes eloquent about equality and charges that
“most of the legal and social problems that arise under the Constitution
stem from the belief, held by some people, that they are better than other

80.
81.

Huhn, supra note 1, at 6-7 n.28.
Huhn, supra note 1, at 6-7 n.28.
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people.”82 Unfortunately, he violates his own principle by treating
traditional religious people as inferiors who should be silenced. Like
Tom and Daisy Buchanan in The Great Gatsby,83 Professor Huhn and
other supporters of the gay movement consider their own views
advanced, enlightened. They go around carelessly smashing up our
social norms. Comfortable in their sense of superiority, they do not
bother to think seriously about the effects of their acts. They “let other
people clean up the mess”84 they make.
There are strong public policy reasons – especially the care of
children – for retaining traditional marriage. This policy does not violate
either the constitutional or the philosophical principles of equality.
The war between the gay movement and religious freedom is
already major and is growing rapidly. Unlike many other public
controversies, such as abortion, this war will not be resolved in a final,
conclusive battle. Rather it will rage in innumerable small skirmishes in
a variety of contexts. Homosexuals, like all people, are entitled to be
treated decently and, in some cases, to be protected from discrimination.
These rights, however, must not come at the expense of religious
freedom. In general, people should be free to express their religious
beliefs even when those beliefs are unpleasant for homosexuals. A
reasonable balance must be struck between the warring factions.

82.
83.
84.

Huhn, supra note 1, at 10.
See supra note **.
Supra note **.
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